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Abstract
According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes.
While noncognitivists have devoted great eort to explaining the nature of nor-
mative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards
normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder
whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear
that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the ‘Many Attitudes Problem’:
the problem of developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of
attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem
and proposes a solution.
1 The Problem
We all have normative beliefs. I believe that lying is wrong, and presumably you do too.
But what does this belief involve?
One answer comes from the cognitivist, who maintains that normative belief is much
like descriptive (that is, non-normative) belief. According to the cognitivist, both nor-
mative and descriptive beliefs represent the world as being a certain way. Someone who
believes that sea levels are rising is in a psychological state that represents the world as
one where sea levels are rising. Similarly, someone who believes that lying is wrong is
in a psychological state that represents the world as one where lying is wrong.
The noncognitivist tells a dierent story. While descriptive beliefs aim to represent
the world, normative beliefs do not. According to the noncognitivist, normative beliefs
are really just conative attitudes—states of desire, approval, and the like. On a simple
version of this picture, all it is to believe that lying is wrong is to disapprove of lying.1
1In the early years, noncognitivists proclaimed that there are no normative beliefs (e.g., Ayer 1936). But
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While the noncognitivist picture is highly controversial, even its critics usually admit
that it has some appealing features. Two in particular are worth highlighting. First, since
desire-like states are inherently motivational, noncognitivism explains why someone
who believes that lying is wrong will—at least in normal circumstances—be pro tanto
motivated to avoid lying.2 Second, since noncognitivism takes normative belief to be a
conative relation towards descriptive propositions, it oers to explain normative thought
in fully naturalistic terms.
Despite its appeal, noncognitivism faces signicant challenges. By now, much ink
has been spilled over the most well-known of these challenges—in particular, the Frege-
Geach Problem. In this paper, I investigate a problem that has received comparatively
little attention.
The problem starts with the observation that belief is not the only attitude we take
towards normative matters. Consider Lyle the compulsive liar. Lyle might desire to do
the right thing. As a result of this desire, he might wonder whether lying is morally
permissible. He might hope that it is, and fear that it is not. What do these attitudes
involve?
For cognitivists, there is no great mystery here. Just as normative belief and de-
scriptive belief are the same sort of psychological state, so too are normative hope and
descriptive hope (and likewise for the other attitudes). Thus cognitivists can say, ‘Give
me your favorite story about what’s involved in hoping for a promotion, or world peace,
or what have you. On my view, to hope that lying is permissible is to be in the same sort
of psychological state, just with a normative proposition as its content.’
But what should noncognitivists say? This is far from clear. If normative belief is
just a conative attitude, what is normative hope (or fear, or desire)? Are these conative
attitudes as well? If so, can we say anything systematic about how these attitudes relate
to—and dier from—the conative attitude that constitutes normative belief?
Following Schroeder, call this the ‘Many Attitudes Problem.’3 Thus far, noncogni-
tivists have said little about this problem. Many noncognitivists have developed detailed
accounts of the conative attitude that constitutes normative belief, and a few have also
contemporary noncognitivists have sought to distance themselves from the more radical proclamations of
their intellectual forebears. Contemporary ‘quasi-realists’ allow that there are normative beliefs. It’s just
that normative beliefs are best understood as desire-like states (Blackburn 1993, 1998; Gibbard 2003; Yalcin
2012). For further discussion of the quasi-realist notion of belief, see Ridge (2006a); Köhler (2017).
2For versions of this ‘Argument from Motivation’ for noncognitivism, see Blackburn (1998: 61); Steven-
son (1937: 16); Gibbard (2003: chp.7). For critical discussion, see Svavarsdóttir (1999).
3See Schroeder (2008b: 715-716; 2010: 84; 2013b: 414-415). See also Shiller (2017).
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discussed related attitudes, such as credence and knowledge.4 However, none has ven-
tured beyond these ‘belief-y’ attitudes; none has oered a systematic account of non-
doxastic attitudes towards normative matters.5
This lacuna is both surprising and worrisome. It is surprising, because noncogni-
tivists aspire to give an account of all normative thought. Given this lofty ambition,
the standard practice of focusing on one species of normative thought—the doxastic
attitudes—seems parochial. And it is worrisome, because if noncognitivists cannot give
a plausible account of the nondoxastic attitudes, then their entire project is doomed.
2 The Game Plan
This paper develops a solution to the Many Attitudes Problem on behalf of noncogni-
tivists. As a general strategy, I suggest that we start by investigating the functional roles
of various nondoxastic attitudes. It’s uncontroversial that the functional roles of dierent
propositional attitudes are interconnected. It’s more controversial—but, I’ll argue, still
plausible—that the functional roles of a wide variety of attitudes can be at least partially
characterized in terms of two privileged attitudes, belief and desire.
To motivate this idea, consider: what is it to hope that p? As a very rough rst pass,
hoping that p seems to involve having some positive degree of belief in p, as well as a
desire for p. What is it to fear that p? As a very rough rst pass, fearing that p also seems
to involve having some positive degree of belief in p, as well as a desire—specically a
desire for ¬p. Generalizing from examples like this, we might venture the following big
picture hypothesis:
Belief-Desire Reduction: A wide variety of propositional attitudes have a functional
4For noncognitivist accounts of belief, see Gibbard (1990, 2003); Köhler (2013); Björnsson and McPherson
(2014). For noncognitivist theories of credence, see Sepielli (2012); Eriksson and Olinder (2016); Ridge (2018).
For noncognitivist takes on knowledge, see Blackburn (1996); Gibbard (2003: chp.11).
5The one exception is Köhler (2017: 205-207), who briey discusses how noncognitivists might under-
stand normative desire, as well as the attitude of entertaining the thought that. . . While there are some im-
portant dierences between our approaches (see fn. 14), I am broadly sympathetic to Köhler’s suggestions.
Indeed, the project of this paper is to systematically expand something in the spirit of Köhler’s compressed
remarks into a full-edged theory of normative attitudes.
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core that can be specied in terms of some combination of belief and desire.6,7
Suppose noncognitivists were to embrace this hypothesis. Then the Many Attitudes
Problem becomes considerably easier. After all, noncognitivists will be able to under-
stand a wide variety of attitudes towards normative matters in terms of two more basic
attitudes: normative belief and normative desire. Now, we’ve already noted that noncog-
nitivists have developed detailed accounts of normative belief. Assuming one of these
accounts proves viable, all that remains is for noncognitivists to explain normative de-
sire.
Can this be done? I’ll argue that there are grounds for optimism. According to a stan-
dard approach in philosophy of mind, the functional role of desire can be characterized
in terms of various dispositions. For example, we are often told that desiring p disposes
you to take whatever actions you believe will bring about p, or to experience pleasure
on coming to believe p, etc. Now, these dispositions are themselves formulated in terms
of what the relevant agent will do—or experience—provided they have certain beliefs. In
the case of normative desire, these will be normative beliefs. Assuming noncognitivists
can make sense of normative belief, they can use this dispositional approach to make
sense of normative desire. Combine this approach with Belief-Desire Reduction and you
get a recipe for understanding a wide variety of attitudes in terms of belief.
That’s the general strategy. Here’s how I’ll execute it. §3 discusses some initial moves
in response to the Many Attitudes Problem and lays out two desiderata on a solution. §4
looks at how noncognitivists can make sense of normative desire. The rest of the paper
is devoted to using this account of normative desire—together with the noncognitivist’s
preferred account of normative belief—to get a purchase on various other attitudes, à
la Belief-Desire Reduction. §5 considers normative intention; §6 considers normative
hope and fear; §7 investigates factive attitudes; and §8 briey discusses wondering and
supposing. §9 concludes by comparing my approach with an alternative solution that
relies on a hybrid expressivist framework.
6The notion that many propositional attitudes can be reduced to simpler components can be found as
far back as Descartes’ Passions of the Soul. For contemporary endorsements of Belief-Desire Reduction,
see Lewis (1974: 332) and Searle (1983: 31-36). Even when it is not explicitly endorsed, I think that some
version of Belief-Desire Reduction can be discerned in the background of many programs in philosophy of
mind—for example, the belief-desire theory of intention (§5). For a recent attempt to explain a wide variety
of mental phenomena in terms of belief and desire, see Sinhababu (2017).
7There are dierent ways of eshing out Belief-Desire Reduction, depending on how one thinks the
reduction goes. In order for my strategy to get o the ground, I only need the claim that a wide variety
of attitudes can be partially characterized in terms of some combination of belief and desire. I discuss this
issue at greater length later in the paper (§4.5).
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3 Desiderata on a Solution
Some might think that the Many Attitudes Problem admits of an easy solution. While
old school noncognitivists had no truck with normative propositions, in more recent
years noncognitivists have changed their tune. A number of noncognitivists in the quasi-
realist tradition have taken pains to make sense of some notion of ‘propositions’ or ‘se-
mantic contents’ that can be applied to normative discourse. For example, Gibbard (2003,
2013) takes semantic contents to be sets ofworld, hyperplan pairs, where a hyperplan rep-
resents the content of a maximally decided planning state. And Schroeder (2008a, 2013b)
develops a noncognitivist view on which semantic contents are pairs of properties, one
of which entails the other.8 Once the noncognitivist has some suitable notion of seman-
tic content on the table, can’t they simply say that any attitude verb—‘believes’, ‘desires’,
‘hopes’, etc.—relates an agent to one of these contents? If so, won’t they have solved the
Many Attitudes Problem?
However, this easy solution overlooks a crucial part of the noncognitivist program.
Recall that one goal of noncognitivism is to explain normative thought using natural-
istically respectable resources. For this reason, noncognitivists who invoke normative
contents do not simply claim that agents believe these contents. Rather, they give us
a detailed psychological story about what it is to believe such contents—a story that is
faithful to the key noncognitivist commitments.
For example, Gibbard does not merely claim that people believe sets of world, hy-
perplan pairs. He also tells us what this involves. Very roughly, to believe a set of world,
hyperplan pairs is to plan to act and feel in various ways. Since plans are conative states,
this story oers to vindicate the noncognitivist link between normative belief and cona-
tion. And since the contents of these plans are specied without recourse to normative
notions, this story also makes good on noncognitivism’s naturalistic ambitions.9
We are now in a position to see what is wrong with the easy solution to the Many
Attitudes Problem. The problem is that while noncognitivists have oered detailed, nat-
uralistically respectable accounts of what is involved in believing normative contents,
they have not yet oered analogous accounts of what is involved in hoping for (or fear-
ing, or desiring . . . ) normative contents. This is precisely where the Many Attitudes
8One standard motivation for appealing to noncognitivist contents is to solve the Frege-Geach Problem.
See, in particular, Gibbard (1990: chp.5; 2003: chp.3).
9Similarly, Schroeder does not simply say that people believe pairs of properties. He tells us what this
involves: to believe a pair of properties ⟨pi1, pi2⟩ is to be for both pi1 and pi2, where being for is a desire-like
state.
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Problem gets its bite: the hard work is to explain what is involved in hoping for some
set of world, hyperplan pairs (for example), and to do so in naturalistically respectable
terms.
This suggests the following desideratum on a solution to our problem:
Explanatory Requirement: For any attitude α that it is possible to adopt towards
some normative matter η, a solution to the Many Attitudes Problem should ex-
plain the central psychological features of adopting α towards η. And it should do
so in a way that is consistent with noncognitivism’s naturalistic ambitions.
A second desideratum is due to Schroeder (2010, 2013b). Schroeder observes that
normative desire has a lot in common with descriptive desire. For example, both play a
similar role in explaining action. If someone desires a pizza, we expect them to perform
actions aimed at pizza-acquisition. If someone desires to do good, we expect them to
perform actions aimed at bringing about the good. A solution to the Many Attitudes
Problem should explain these commonalities. That is:
Commonality Requirement: A solution to the Many Attitudes Problem should ex-
plain why attitudes towards normative matters share many properties with the
corresponding attitudes towards descriptive matters.
Now comes the hard part: developing a theory of normative attitudes that satises
these desiderata. To do so, I’ll start with normative desire (§4). Once we’ve seen how
noncognitivists can make sense of normative desire, I’ll appeal to our big picture hy-
pothesis about propositional attitudes (Belief-Desire Reduction) to show how we can get
a grip on a host of other attitudes (§§5-8).
4 Desire
What is the functional role of desire? Most philosophers who have tackled this question
agree on this much: someone who desires p has a dierent suite of dispositions than
someone who believes (or imagines, or regrets) that p. However, that’s where the con-
sensus ends; there is considerable disagreement over which dispositions are necessary
and sucient for desire.
For our purposes, we need not wed ourselves to any particular answer to this ques-
tion. Rather, I’ll review the two main dispositional conditions on desire in the current lit-
erature. I’ll show that both conditions can be extended to normative desire in a way that
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is fully consistent with noncognitivism. This should make us optimistic that noncogni-
tivists can explain the functional role of normative desire using standard dispositionalist
resources.
4.1 Dispositions to Act
Ask your average philosopher to give an account of desire, and chances are they will
say something about its role in motivating action.10 As a rst pass: if Alison desires
to eat pizza, then we’d expect this desire to motivate her to eat pizza. But this simple
formulation isn’t quite right. After all, desires do not motivate action all by themselves,
but only in conjunction with beliefs about how to achieve the objects of desire. Alison’s
desire for pizza will be of little help unless it is accompanied by a belief about the means
of pizza-acquisition.
Here’s a more promising way of eshing out a motivational condition on desire:
Dispositions-to-Act If S desires p, then S is disposed to perform whatever action(s) S
believes has the best chance of satisfying p.
While more plausible than our rst pass formulation, Dispositions-to-Act still faces
various challenges. To mention just one concern, some might worry that it delivers the
wrong results in cases where the most eective means of bringing about your desire
conicts with something else you desire. For example, Gunther desires to alleviate his
hunger. He knows that eating a peanut butter sandwich would do the trick. Still, if he has
a deadly peanut allergy he might have no disposition whatsoever to eat the sandwich.11
For our purposes, we need not be overly concerned with counterexamples along
these lines. After all, our goal is not to defend any particular dispositional condition on
desire, but rather to show how various candidate conditions can be understood from a
noncognitivist perspective. That said, it will be helpful to briey remark on how propo-
nents of a motivational condition on desire might try to defuse this sort of worry. One
promising option is to point out dispositions can be masked (Johnston 1992). Suppose a
fragile vase is dropped. Typically it will manifest its fragility by breaking. But not if some
external factor intervenes, say, a pillow, bubble wrap, a guardian angel. Applied to Gun-
ther: perhaps the belief that eating the peanut butter sandwich will alleviate his hunger
10This idea that desire is connected with motivation traces back at least as far as Hume’s Treatise. For
contemporary developments of this idea, see Anscombe (1957); Stalnaker (1984); Smith (1987), among many
others.
11Thanks to a referee for raising this sort of case.
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does generate a very weak disposition to eat the sandwich. But this disposition is masked
by his much stronger desire to stay alive. After all, since Gunther knows that consuming
the sandwich is likely to have fatal consequences, Dispositions-to-Act predicts this desire
will generate a countervailing—and presumably much stronger—disposition to abstain.
Suppose then that we accept Dispositions-to-Act, or at least something in the ball-
park. Let us now tackle our main question: can the noncognitivist use this condition to
make sense of normative desires?
I claim the answer is yes. To see why, it will be helpful to consider a concrete case of
a normative desire. Awaking Monday morning, Michelle desires the following:
no wrong: I do nothing wrong today.
According to Dispositions-to-Act, Michelle’s desire for nowrong consists—in part—
in a disposition to act in whatever ways she believes will ensure that she avoids wrong-
doing. For example, suppose Michelle has promised to see a movie with a friend and
believes it would be wrong for her to break this promise. Thus she believes:
promise: The only way to ensure that I do nothing wrong today is to keep my
promise.
Dispositions-to-Act predicts that Michelle will be disposed to keep her promise.
Noncognitivists can happily accept all of this. Where they part ways with the cog-
nitivist is in their account of the relevant means-ends belief (promise). For the noncog-
nitivist, Michelle’s belief in promise is itself a nonrepresentational, desire-like state. For
example, noncognitivists like Gibbard will analyze Michelle’s belief in promise as a ‘con-
tingency plan’: a pro tanto plan to blame herself for failing to keep her promise, in the
contingency that she fails to do so.
Of course, if Michelle’s belief in promise is itself a desire-like state, then this will in-
volve further dispositions to act. But no vicious regress looms. According to Dispositions-
to-Act, Michelle’s belief in promise will dispose her to act in whatever ways she believes
will ensure that she keeps her promise. Crucially, these further beliefs are descriptive,
not normative. (For example, they will be beliefs of the form: Going to the movie at
such-and-such a time is a way of ensuring I keep my promise.)
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4.2 Dispositions to Experience
Another prominent line of thought holds that desires involve dispositions to undergo
certain experiences.12 This idea holds considerable pretheoretic appeal. If Bree wants
the Mets to win, we’d expect her to experience positively valenced emotions—joy, sat-
isfaction, contentment—if she learns that the Mets won. We’d also expect her to expe-
rience negatively valenced emotions—disappointment, discontent, sorrow—if she learns
that the Mets lost.
Here is one way of cashing out this idea more generally:
Dispositions-to-Experience: If S desires that p, then S is disposed to experience plea-
sure in the event that S comes to believe p, and S is disposed to experience displea-
sure in the event that S comes to believe ¬p.13
Can noncognitivists use an experiential condition along these lines to make sense of
normative desires? I think so. According to Dispositions-to-Experience, if an agent has
a normative desire, they are disposed to undergo certain experiences on coming to hold
various normative beliefs. Since noncognitivists already have an account of normative
beliefs, they should have no trouble making sense of a disposition to experience pleasure
or displeasure on coming to hold normative beliefs.
To illustrate, return to Michelle, who desires no wrong. According to Dispositions-
to-Experience, this entails that she is disposed to experience pleasure on coming to be-
lieve that she has done no wrong, and disposed to experience displeasure on coming to
believe that she has acted wrongly. Now, the noncognitivist already has an account of
what it is for Michelle to come to believe no wrong (or its negation). Here too, this
will be a matter of acquiring some conative state. For example, on Gibbard’s (2003) view
this will be a matter of Michelle acquiring a plan to refrain from blaming herself for any
actions performed on Monday.
4.3 Taking Stock
In this section, I’ve sketched a recipe for developing a noncognitivist theory of normative
desire. The recipe was to look at two leading candidates for a dispositional condition on
normative desire and show that both can be squared with noncognitivism.
12For development and defense of this idea, see Morillo (1990); Strawson (1994); Schueler (1995); Sinhab-
abu (2017), among others.
13Note that since both Dispositions-to-Act and Dispositions-to-Experience are formulated as necessary
conditions on desire, the two are perfectly compatible.
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Of course, some might think that the functional role of desire is not exhausted by
these two dispositions. However, my recipe extends in principle to any number of further
features of desire. For any dispositional feature f , the key question is whether we can
formulate its stimulus condition using resources that are already in the noncognitivist
toolkit. If so, the noncognitivist can use the strategy developed here to get a grip on f .
The account of normative desire that emerges has a number of virtues. First, it satis-
es the Explanatory Requirement. It does not merely say that agents stand in the desire
relation to some expressivist content. Rather, it gives a substantive account of what nor-
mative desire involves, and it does so in a way that is consistent with the noncognitivist’s
naturalistic project.
Second, it satises the Commonality Requirement. On the framework developed
here, what unites normative and descriptive desires is that they share a common dispo-
sitional role.
Third, my treatment of normative desire is independently motivated, in the sense
that it does not make any ad hoc stipulations about what normative desire involves.
Rather, we started with commonly accepted conditions on the functional role of desire.
We then combined these with the noncognitivist conception of normative belief, and we
got our noncognitivist conditions on normative desire as an immediate result.14
Before moving on to other nondoxastic attitudes, let me address some natural con-
cerns that might arise for this account.
4.4 Objections Addressed
Objection: ‘Perhaps some normative desires motivate action—for example, Michelle’s
desire to avoid wrongdoing. But many normative desires seem to lack any motivational
14My recipe for developing a noncognitivist account of normative desire bears comparison with the ac-
count in Köhler (2017: 205-207), which was developed independently and is, to my knowledge, the only
published discussion of how expressivists should analyze desire. On Köhler’s account, descriptive desire
and normative desire have dierent “conceptual roles.” The conceptual role of desiring a descriptive propo-
sition is to motivate action, à la Dispositions-to-Act (p.205). By contrast, Köhler denies that normative
desires motivate action. Instead, the conceptual role of desiring some normative proposition p is dispose
one to “take pleasure in entertaining the thought that p”, to have one’s attention drawn to the thought that
p, and to entertain this thought in a “fantasizing manner” (p.206).
Köhler’s description of the conceptual role of normative desire has some important similarities to
Dispositions-to-Experience. In this regard, our approaches are complementary. That said, there is also
a major dierence: since Köhler denies that normative desires motivate action, he is not able to derive the
conceptual role of normative desire as a special instance of a more general conceptual role shared by all
desires.
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pull. Recall Lyle the compulsive liar. Lyle might want lying to be morally permissible.
But we wouldn’t expect him to perform any actions aimed at rendering lying permissible.’
Reply: In response, it will be helpful to make two points. First, we should note that
this objection doesn’t reveal anything special about normative desires. After all, we can
come up with descriptive desires that also seem to lack motivational pull. Meet Claude,
who desires to have been born with royal blood. Even though he has this desire, we
wouldn’t expect Claude to perform any actions aimed at giving himself a royal lineage.
Second, and more importantly, such characters are actually compatible with a moti-
vational condition on desire. Here is a natural way of unpacking Dispositions-to-Act:
Dispositions-to-Act (Unpacked) If S desires p, then, for any action φ, S has the fol-
lowing disposition: to φ in the event that S comes to believe that φ-ing has the
best chance of satisfying p.15
Thus unpacked, Dispositions-to-Act can make sense of both Lyle and Claude. The reason
why Lyle is not disposed to perform any actions aimed at rendering lying permissible is
that Lyle believes that there are no such actions. (Presumably Lyle thinks that the moral
status of lying is outside of his control.) Still, Lyle plausibly has a conditional disposition:
he is disposed to perform various actions conditional on coming to believe that so acting
will render lying permissible. For example, he is disposed to pray to a certain deity in the
event that he comes to believe that so praying will have a chance of aecting the moral
status of lying. (Similar remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to Claude.)
Of course, there are tricky questions about how to understand such conditional dis-
positions. For our purposes, we need not try to settle these questions. But to take an
o-the-shelf analysis, suppose one adopts a modal account of dispositions (Manley and
Wasserman 2008; Vetter 2014; Beddor and Pavese 2018). Then it would be natural to
analyze an ascription of the form, ⌜x is disposed to ψ in the event that C⌝ as saying that
in a suciently high proportion of some relevant domain of worlds where C obtains,
x ψs. On this approach, Lyle has the relevant conditional disposition if and only if in
a suitably high proportion of some relevant domain of worlds where Lyle believes that
praying to a deity will render lying permissible, he prays to this deity.16
15This is arguably equivalent to interpreting the disposition as taking wide-scope over a conditional—e.g.,
if S desires p, then, for any action φ, S is disposed to (φ if S believes that φ will bring about p).
16A referee points out that a variant of this worry is less easily defused. Consider Kyle, who desires the
conjunction c: lying is permissible and I (Kyle) never existed. According to Dispositions-to-Act (Unpacked),
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Objection: ‘Dispositions-to-Act and Dispositions-to-Experience presuppose that the
objects of desires are propositions. When it comes to normative desires, these will be
normative propositions—for example, whatever proposition corresponds to no wrong.
But you haven’t told us how to understand these propositions from a noncognitivist
perspective.’
Reply: Fair enough. But, as we noted in §3, many noncognitivists in the quasi-realist
tradition have already developed theories of normative propositions. So there is noth-
ing in principle to prevent a noncognitivist from making sense of desires towards these
entities.
In fact, my account of normative desire makes it easier to defend a noncognitivist
account of propositions.17 One of the main challenges facing a noncognitivist account
of propositions is to show that these ‘propositions’ are really worthy of the name—that is,
to show that they can play the various roles traditionally assigned to propositions. One
of these roles is to serve as the contents of propositional attitudes. While noncognitivists
like Gibbard have taken pains to show that their normative propositions can serve as the
contents of belief, thus far not much work has been done to show they can serve as the
contents of other attitudes. The account of desire developed here helps ll this gap.
Objection: ‘You claim that normative and descriptive desires share a common dis-
positional core. But this apparent unity masks a fundamental dierence. According
to Dispositions-to-Act, whether someone desires some descriptive content depends on
what they are disposed to do if they have certain descriptive beliefs. Whether someone
desires some normative content depends on what they are disposed to do if they have
certain normative beliefs. If normative and descriptive beliefs are very dierent states (as
noncognitivists claim), then there are really two very dierent dispositional roles here.
And similarly when it comes to Dispositions-to-Experience. So your account of desire
doesn’t satisfy the Commonality Requirement after all.’
this amounts to saying that Kyle is disposed to act in various ways in the event that he comes to believe
that so acting will satisfy c. But can we even make sense of forming such an absurd belief?
In response, let me make two further points. First, while the belief in question is absurd, it might still
be psychologically possible. After all, many people have confused beliefs about the ways in which they
could change the past, as the paradoxes of time travel reveal. Second, the problem raised by this case is
not specic to normative desires or any noncognitivist theory thereof. After all, the troublesome feature
of Kyle’s desire is its second conjunct (his desire not to have been born), which is a descriptive content.
As long as there is some way for proponents of a motivational condition on desire to make sense of Kyle’s
desire never to have been born, noncognitivists should be able to appeal to this solution to make sense of
the conjunctive desire.
17Thanks to a referee for helping me appreciate this point.
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Reply: This is a legitimate challenge. However, noncognitivists already need to satisfy
the Commonality Requirement when it comes to belief (Schroeder 2010: 96-97). After all,
descriptive and normative beliefs have a lot in common. Just as we can agree or disagree
in our descriptive beliefs, we can also agree or disagree in our normative beliefs. Just
as our descriptive beliefs can be appraised as coherent or incoherent, so too can our
normative beliefs. There also seem to be phenomenological similarities: regardless of
whether p is normative or descriptive, believing p usually involves a feeling of ‘coming
down on’ the issue of whether p (Horgan and Timmons 2006).
In the literature, we nd two proposals for explaining these commonalities. The
rst—what I’ll call the ‘Similarity Strategy’—identies normative belief with a special
type of conative state, one that is belief-like in some respects and desire-like in others.
For example, Gibbard (2003) identies normative beliefs with plans. According to Gib-
bard, plans—like descriptive beliefs—can stand in disagreement relations. Suppose I plan
to go out. Suppose that you have a conicting contingency plan: you plan, conditional
on being in my shoes, to stay home. Then, Gibbard says, our plans disagree (2003: 68-69).
Plans can also be assessed for coherence or incoherence: I cannot coherently plan to to go
out while also planning to stay home. Arguably, plans also have a similar phenomenol-
ogy of ‘coming down on’ some issue: if I plan to go out, then I take myself to have settled
the question of whether or not I will go out. According to this strategy, normative belief
does not have the exact same functional role as descriptive belief. But the two states
have suciently similar functional roles to explain the indisputable commonalities.
According to the second strategy—what I’ll call the ‘Identity Strategy’—normative
and descriptive beliefs have the very same functional role, but this functional role is de-
ned in a way that is consistent with core noncognitivist commitments. For example,
Schroeder (2008a) proposes the surprising view that both normative and descriptive be-
liefs are conative attitudes—attitudes of being for. To have a descriptive belief that p is
to be for proceeding as if p, where to proceed as if p is, roughly, to take p as settled in
deciding what to do.18
For our purposes, we need not adjudicate between these two strategies.As long as
we have some viable explanation of the similarities between descriptive and normative
18In Beddor (2019), I defend a dierent version of the Identity Strategy. On the view developed there,
normative and descriptive beliefs have the same functional role—a role characterized in terms of their action-
guiding potential. However, an agent stands in this belief relation towards a normative proposition just
in case they stand in a dierent psychological relation—in particular, a conative relation—towards some
descriptive proposition. As a result, we still vindicate the noncognitivist idea that an agent believes lying is
wrong if and only if they desire that no one lies. See Beddor (2019: 15-24) for the details.
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beliefs, we can leverage it to account for the similarities between descriptive and nor-
mative desires. Proponents of the Identity Strategy can maintain that normative and
descriptive desires have the very same functional role. (After all, if believing lying is
wrong has the same functional prole as believing the Mets won, then plausibly the
state of being disposed to experience pleasure in the event one believes that lying is wrong
has the same functional prole as the state of being disposed to experience pleasure in the
event one believes the Mets won.) Proponents of the Similarity Strategy won’t go quite
this far, but they can still maintain that normative and descriptive desires have similar
functional roles. Either way, our account of normative desire has good claim to satisfy
the Commonality Requirement.
Objection: ‘You say that Michelle’s desire to do no wrong could combine forces with
her belief in promise in order to motivate her to act. But doesn’t this run contrary to the
spirit of noncognitivism? Noncognitivists usually claim that normative beliefs can di-
rectly motivate us to act without any accompanying desire to do the right thing—indeed,
this claim is at the heart of the venerable ‘Argument from Motivation.’ Consequently,
most noncognitivists would hold that someone who believes promise could be directly
motivated to keep their promise; they do not need a further desire to do no wrong.’
Reply: Distinguish between two claims: (i) normative beliefs can result in action with-
out an accompanying normative desire, (ii) normative beliefs always result in action
without an accompanying normative desire. The account developed here is consistent
with (i) but not (ii). However, the Argument from Motivation only supports (i). Indeed,
noncognitivists should avoid claiming that our actions are never causally inuenced by
desires to do good, since this seems patently false.
To see why my account is consistent with (i), imagine the following scenario. As be-
fore, Michelle believes promise. But this time, she is not disposed to derive any pleasure
from learning that she avoided wrongdoing, or to derive any displeasure from learning
that she failed to do so. Nonetheless, when it comes time to see the movie with her
friend, she trudges o to the cinema, and the reason for this is her belief in promise.
In this case, her moral belief results in action, but she does not desire to do no wrong,
because the requisite dispositions to experience are absent.19
19Indeed, one advantage of my account of normative desire is that it makes room for agents who desire
to do evil. Imagine a further variant of our scenario in which Michelle desires to do something wrong. The
account developed here predicts that this desire consists—in part—in a disposition to break her promise,
given a belief such as promise. Of course, since her belief in promise is itself a desire-like state, this means
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4.5 Looking Forward
Having shown how noncognitivists can make sense of normative desires, the next step is
to leverage this understanding to get a purchase on other propositional attitudes towards
normative matters.
In order to do so, I’ll make use of our big picture hypothesis about the structure of
propositional attitudes: Belief-Desire Reduction. According to Belief-Desire Reduction,
a host of propositional attitudes have a functional core that can be spelled out in terms
of some combination of beliefs and desires. If this hypothesis is correct, then noncogni-
tivists can use their account of normative desire—together with their preferred account
of normative belief—to make sense of attitudes like intending to do the right thing, fearing
one has acted wrongly, etc.
Of course, Belief-Desire Reduction is controversial. However, we need not claim
that all propositional attitudes can be fully analyzed in terms of belief and desire. It’s
ne if there are residual features of the functional proles of certain attitudes, provided
these residual features can themselves be explicated in a way that is consistent with
noncognitivism.
To make the case for Belief-Desire Reduction, let’s take a closer look at some specic
attitudes. Start with intention.
5 Intention
What is the functional role of intention? This is a matter of dispute, but let’s start with
what’s relatively uncontroversial. It’s widely thought that intention has a doxastic re-
quirement. Exactly how this requirement goes depends on who you ask: some say that
intending to φ entails believing one will φ; others that it entails believing one is likely to
φ; still others that it merely requires the absence of a belief that one will not φ. To moti-
vate some version of this doxastic requirement, note that it would be very odd—perhaps
downright incoherent—for Michelle to claim, ‘I fully intend to go to the movies, but I
know for certain that I won’t.’20
A number of philosophers have argued that intention also requires desire: Michelle
that evil Michelle will have conicting noncognitive attitudes, and hence conicting dispositions. But this
by itself is no cause for concern—indeed, this seems to be precisely what noncognitivists should say about
such cases.
20For defense of a doxastic condition on intention, see, among others, Grice (1971); Audi (1973); Harman
(1976); Davis (1984); Wallace (2001); Marušić and Schwenkler (2018).
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cannot intend to go to the movies unless she desires to go to the movies. This is a bit
more controversial than the belief requirement. After all, Michelle might coherently say,
‘I intend to go to the movies, because I promised I would. But I’d much rather stay
home.’ However, at the very least intention seems to display some of the dispositional
hallmarks of desire—in particular, its motivational aspect. If Michelle intends to go to the
movies, then we’d expect her to be at least somewhat disposed to take whatever actions
she believes will direct her towards the cinema.
Noncognitivists can use these belief-desire conditions to get a purchase on norma-
tive intention. For example, imagine that Michelle intends to do no wrong. What does
this intention involve? According to the belief condition, it involves believing that she
will do no wrong—or, at the very least, it involves lacking a belief that she will engage
in wrongdoing. According to the desire condition, it also involves desiring to do no
wrong—or, at the very least, it involves some of the dispositional hallmarks of so desir-
ing. The noncognitivist can make sense of both of these conditions, since by now they
are equipped with accounts of both normative desire and normative belief.
Is any combination of belief and desire sucient for intention? Proponents of the
belief-desire theory of intention say yes: all it takes to have an intention is to have a
desire which is accompanied by a means-ends belief about how to satisfy this desire.21
However, the belief-desire theory faces a number of important objections. Perhaps the
most well-developed critique is due to Bratman (1987), who argues that intention in-
volves a number of functional features that cannot be explained by any combination
of beliefs and desires. Luckily, for our purposes we need not take a stand on this dis-
pute. As noted in §4.5, it’s enough if any residual features of the functional role of
intention—any features not exhausted by the belief-desire conditions—can be cashed out
in noncognitivist-friendly terms.
Moreover, I think there are grounds for optimism on this front. Consider just one
feature of intention that—according to Bratman—proves dicult to explain in terms of
belief and desire. As we noted in our discussion of Gibbard’s view (§4.4), intending to
bring about p seems to involve ‘settling’ the question of whether to bring about p. To
use Bratman’s example, if I intend to spend the afternoon in the library, I’ll be disposed
to avoid reconsidering whether to spend the afternoon in the library (1987: 18-19). By
21Versions of a belief-desire theory of intention are defended in Davidson (1963), Audi (1973), Davis
(1984); Ridge (1998), and Sinhababu (2013, 2017). Applying the simplest version of the belief-desire theory
to normative intention, the idea would be that Michelle intends to do no wrong just in case she both desires
to do no wrong and she has a belief about the means of doing no wrong (e.g., a belief such as promise).
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contrast, if I desire to spend the afternoon in the library, I might nd myself mulling over
whether to go to the movies instead. Here’s one way of formulating this idea:
Dispositions-to-Avoid-Reconsidering If S intends p, then S is disposed to refrain
from seriously considering actions that S believes to be inconsistent with p.
Let us grant that this is a feature of intention that the belief-desire theory leaves out.22
Still, the noncognitivist need not fret, since this feature is itself formulated entirely in
terms that the noncognitivist has a handle on. To see this, consider again Michelle’s
intention to do no wrong. According to Dispositions-to-Avoid-Reconsidering, this in-
volves a disposition to avoid seriously considering actions that she believes to be wrong.
For example, if she believes that kicking kittens is wrong, she’ll be disposed to avoid
seriously considering kicking kittens. Noncognitivists can make perfect sense of this
disposition, since they already have a story about the relevant normative beliefs. More
generally, the strategy we used in the case of normative desire will apply equally well to
intention: for any putative feature f of its dispositional prole, the trick is to show that
we can cash out f using resources that are already available to the noncognitivist.
6 Fear and Hope
Turn next to the ‘emotive doxastic’ attitudes (Anand and Hacquard 2013), such as fear
and hope. Suppose Edmund fears that a burglar will break in. What does this involve?
For starters, Edmund needs to have at least some degree of belief that a burglar will break
in—he cannot fear what he knows for certain will never transpire. But this is not all. If
he yearns to be burgled or is indierent towards home invasion, it would be incorrect to
describe his attitude as ‘fear.’
This suggests the following belief-desire conditions on fear:
Belief-Desire Account of Fear: If S fears that p, then both:
1. S has some degree of belief in p,23
2. S desires ¬p.
22For doubts on this score, see Ridge (1998); Sinhababu (2013, 2017).
23Arguably, we should place further constraints on the degree of belief. Perhaps in order to genuinely
fear that p, S’s degree of belief in p needs to be suciently high. But it also should not be too high—if
Edmund is certain a burglar will break in, it seems wrong to describe him as fearing this outcome. I’ll set
these complications aside going forward.
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Next, compare fear with hope. Like fear, hope seems to require some positive cre-
dence that its object will obtain: Sara cannot hope for a promotion if she is certain she
won’t receive one. But unlike fear, hope requires a desire for its object: if Sara is apathetic
about a promotion, or actively shuns one, then she does not hope for one.
This suggests parallel belief-desire conditions on hope:
Belief-Desire Account of Hope If S hopes that p, then both:
1. S has some degree of belief in p,
2. S desires p.24
We can use these analyses to get a grip on normative fear and hope. Recall Lyle,
who hopes that lying is permissible but fears that it isn’t. According to our belief-desire
conditions, Lyle’s hope involves (i) having some degree of belief that lying is permissible,
(ii) desiring that lying is permissible. And his fear involves the same desire, together with
the fact that he has some degree of belief that lying is impermissible.
Even if belief and desire are necessary conditions on fear and hope, are they also
sucient conditions? As in the case of intention, this is controversial. But here too we
need not commit ourselves to an armative answer. Noncognitivists can breathe easy
as long as they can make sense of any residual features of fear and hope.
Can they do so? A full assessment would require looking at various candidates for
these residual features. But here too I think there is reason to be hopeful. Consider
just two further conditions on hope that have been proposed in the recent literature:
Meirav (2009) argues that hoping for p requires believing that p is outside of one’s con-
trol; Milona (forthcoming) argues that hoping for p requires a particular relation between
the belief and desire conditions: your degree of belief in p must be part of the cognitive
basis for your desire for p. Neither of these further conditions poses any special diculty
for the noncognitivist.
A dierent source of worry comes from the fact that the belief conditions on fear
and hope were formulated in terms of degrees of belief rather than binary belief. Even if
noncognitivists can account for binary belief, they may face further diculties explain-
ing degrees thereof. What is it for Lyle to have, say, a .3 credence that lying is wrong?
An argument due to Smith (2002) gives this worry more bite. The simplest way of
developing a noncognitivist account of credence is to nd some conative attitude that
24These belief-desire conditions on fear and hope were anticipated by Hume (Treatise 2.3.9). For a more
contemporary analysis of fear and hope in terms of these conditions, see Day (1970).
18
a solution to the many attitudes problem
comes in degrees—say, desire or approval. One could then hold that normative credences
are degrees of this state. But Smith convincingly argues that any such account will col-
lapse two distinct dimensions of normative judgment: ‘certitude’ and ‘importance.’ Cer-
titude is one’s degree of condence in a normative judgment; importance is the degree of
wrongness (or rightness) that one judges to obtain. To illustrate, Lyle could have a low
degree of condence (low certitude) that lying is very wrong (high importance). Alter-
natively, he could have a high degree of condence (high certitude) that lying is slightly
wrong (low importance). Any account that reduces normative credence to strength of
desire or approval will lack the structural resources to distinguish between these two
states. The worry, then, is that until some superior account is given, noncognitivists will
not have earned the right to talk of normative credences, and hence will not be able to
use normative credences in their analysis of normative fear and hope.
This is an important concern. However, there at least two reasons for thinking that
noncognitivists should not despair. First, throughout this paper we’ve been granting—at
least for the sake of argument—that the noncognitivist has a viable account of normative
belief. Plausibly, any adequate account of normative belief will also extend to degrees
thereof. So, insofar as we are willing to spot the noncognitivist a story about normative
belief, we should also spot them a story about normative credence.
Second, there are at least some potentially promising proposals for dealing with
Smith’s challenge. The issues here are complex, and a full discussion of the dierent
options is a task for another paper. Here I will just briey mention one potentially at-
tractive response, developed by Sepielli (2012).
Sepielli starts with the idea—found in both Gibbard (1990) and Schroeder (2008a)—
that to believe that φ-ing is wrong is not simply to adopt some conative attitude towards
φ-ing. Rather, it is to adopt some conative attitudes towards a syndrome of reactive
attitudes towards φ-ing. For example, on Gibbard’s version of this view, to believe that
lying is wrong is to have a pro tanto plan to blame and resent liars.25
Sepielli points out that this sort of view has the structure needed to accommodate
Smith’s distinction. After all, noncognitivists now have two graded attitudes—the cona-
tive attitude and the reactive attitude—whereas before they had one. Following Sepielli,
we could identify certitude with degrees of the conative attitude, and identify importance
with the severity of the reactive attitudes. Thus a .3 credence that lying is very wrong
amounts to a low degree of some conative attitude towards severely blaming liars. And
25For discussion of how this sort of view helps solves the ‘negation problem’ for expressivism, see
Schroeder (2008a: chps.4-5).
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a .7 credence that lying is slightly wrong amounts to a high degree of a conative attitude
towards mildly blaming liars.
Of course, this particular account of normative credence is far from uncontrover-
sial.26 My point is not that this account is necessarily correct, just that there are some
potentially promising avenues towards developing a noncognitivist account of norma-
tive credence.27 Given some such account, the noncognitivist is free to put the notion to
work in making sense of fear, hope, and the like.
7 Factive Attitudes
Turn next to factive attitudes, such as knowing, realizing, and regretting. Factive attitudes
show that a strong version of Belief-Desire Reduction is implausible: we cannot hope to
analyze e.g., knowledge entirely in terms of some combination of belief and desire, since
no such combination entails truth. Still, it’s plausible that certain core features of factive
attitudes can be spelled out in terms of belief and desire.
For starters, virtually all factive attitudes entail belief. I cannot know, realize, re-
member, or regret that my keys are in the car unless I believe my keys are in the car.28
26Bykvist and Olson (2012) raise a number of important challenges for this account, e.g.:
(i) Why is the conative attitude that constitutes normative credence gradable in the same ways as
descriptive credence?
(ii) If normative credence and descriptive credence are very dierent states, why can we make compar-
ative condence ascriptions (e.g., I’m more certain that 2+2=4 than that stealing is wrong)?
(iii) According to the Normalization Axiom for normative credence, everyone is rationally required to
be certain of the tautology, Either stealing is wrong or it isn’t. But on Sepielli’s view, this means that
everyone is rationally required to have a maximally strong conative attitude towards the tautology:
Either I will blame for stealing or I won’t (⊺), which seems implausible.
Let me make two brief remarks about how one might address these problems. Arguably, (i) and (ii) are in-
stances of a more general—and by now familiar—question: what explains why normative belief has so much
in common with descriptive belief, given that the former is a desire-like state? As we saw in §4.4, there are
two strategies for answering this: the Similarity Strategy and the Identity Strategy. If either strategy works
for binary belief, it’s natural to hope it will carry over to the ne-grained case. For example, proponents of
the Identity Strategy could say that normative and descriptive credence have the same functional role. This
would explain why both are gradable, and also why we can make comparative condence ascriptions.
With regards to (iii), one option is to question whether this implication is really so objectionable. We’ve
seen that one plausible condition on conative attitudes is given by Dispositions-to-Act. According to
Dispositions-to-Act, desiring ⊺ involves being disposed to act in ways that one believes will satisfy ⊺. Now,
every action trivially satises ⊺; moreover, we can know this a priori. So, at least on a purely motivational
conception of desire, it seems plausible that rational agents are committed to maximally desiring ⊺. For
further discussion of these issues, see Beddor (forthcoming).
27For an alternative approach, see Ridge (2018).
28An exception is forgetting. But even this attitude can be analyzed in terms of the loss of belief.
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Given this, noncognitivists can use their account of normative belief to get at least a
partial purchase on factive attitudes towards normative matters. If Michelle knows (or
realizes, or remembers, or regrets) that she did something wrong, this entails that she is
in whatever conative state constitutes believing that she did something wrong.
Certain factive attitudes—what are sometimes called the ‘emotive factives’—entail
desires in addition to beliefs. Take regret. Edmund cannot regret that a burglar broke in
unless he wishes that he had not been burgled. More generally:
Belief-Desire Conditions on Regret: If S regrets p, then both:
1. S believes p,
2. S desires ¬p.
Since noncognitivists already have a handle on normative desires, they can use these
conditions to get a partial handle on normative regret. Similar remarks apply, mutatis
mutandis, to other emotive factives (e.g., being pleased that one acted justly).29
So it seems we can partially analyze factive attitudes in terms of belief and desire. But
can the residual features of factive attitudes be explained using noncognitivist resources?
Here too, I think there’s reason to be optimistic. The distinguishing feature of factive
attitudes is that they entail truth. Luckily, expressivists in the quasi-realist tradition have
already shown how they can make sense of normative truth. The standard strategy—
developed in detail by Blackburn (1993, 1998) and embraced by Gibbard (2003)—is to
appeal to a minimalist theory of truth. On this view, someone who says, ‘It is true that
lying is wrong’ says the same thing as someone who says, ‘Lying is wrong.’ In both cases,
the speaker expresses their disapproval of lying. Expressivists can use this strategy to
make sense of the distinguishing feature of factive attitudes. On this view, when someone
says, ‘Lyle knows/realizes/regrets that lying is wrong,’ they not only ascribe to Lyle a
certain conative attitude vis-à-vis lying. They also express that they (the speaker) share
this conative attitude.30
29Some hold that emotive factives entail knowledge, not just belief. (See, e.g., Unger (1975); Gordon
(1987); Williamson (2000); Dietz (2018).) If, as I’ll be arguing momentarily, noncognitivists can make sense
of normative knowledge, then they are also in a position to make sense of this stronger entailment.
30Other features of factive attitude ascriptions can be analyzed in a similar fashion. For example, both
Blackburn (1996, 1998) and Gibbard (2003) have argued that noncognitivists can make sense of a ‘No De-
featers’ condition on knowledge. To illustrate with Blackburn’s version of this idea: to say that S’s belief is
immune to defeat is to say that no improvement in S’s epistemic position would result in S abandoning her
belief—where the notion of ‘improvement’ is also understood as the expression of a conative attitude. See
also Moss (2013), who argues that expressivists can make room for modal conditions on knowledge, such
as safety and sensitivity.
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One might worry that if noncognitivists go this route, they’ll no longer be in the
business of explaining the functional roles of the factive attitudes. Rather, they’ll be un-
dertaking a subtly dierent project: providing an analysis of our ascriptions of factive
attitudes. However, I think noncognitivists can take this objection in stride. One of the
key moves in the expressivist repertoire is the strategy of ‘semantic ascent,’ whereby
one replaces rst-order questions with semantic ones. Invited to give an account of the
nature of wrongness, the expressivist demurs, oering instead an analysis of the mean-
ing of ‘wrongness’ talk. Expressivists should feel free to apply this maneuver to factive
attitudes. Invited to give an account of normative knowledge or regret (for example),
they can decline, oering instead an analysis of the meaning of sentences of the form, ‘S
knows/regrets that φ-ing is wrong.’
Noncognitivists who take this line could—and, I think, should—deny that it’s possi-
ble to give a full functional analysis of factive attitudes (at least in any traditional sense).
Still, their semantic analysis of factive attitude ascriptions comes with substantive psy-
chological implications. In particular, it entails various belief-desire conditions (of the
sort discussed above). Indeed, these conditions could plausibly be viewed as constitut-
ing a functional core to the factive attitudes—a core that exhausts the causal role of these
attitudes in explaining behavior. Since this core is explained in noncognitivist-friendly
terms, and since the residual features of the factive attitude ascriptions (e.g., their fac-
tivity) can also be captured using expressivist resources, the resulting analysis has good
claim to satisfying the Explanatory Requirement.
8 Wondering and Supposing
In making the case for Belief-Desire Reduction, I’ve looked at intention, emotive dox-
astics, and factive attitudes. But there are other attitudes that one can take towards
normative matters—attitudes that might appear to be less amenable to Belief-Desire Re-
duction. For example, one can wonder whether lying is wrong; one can also suppose or
hypothesize that it is. How should noncognitivists understand these attitudes?
While my remarks here will be somewhat speculative, I think a preliminary case can
be made for thinking that even these attitudes can be understood in terms of belief and
desire.
Start with wondering. We might hazard an analysis of wondering as desiring to know.
On this view, for Lyle to wonder whether lying is wrong is for him to desire to know
whether lying is wrong. According to the analysis of desire advanced here, this entails
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that Lyle is disposed to act in ways that he thinks will lead him to attain this knowl-
edge (talking to ethicists, ruminating on the consequences of lying, etc.). It also entails
that Lyle is disposed to experience pleasure upon believing that he has come to know
whether lying is wrong, and to experience displeasure upon believing that this knowl-
edge has eluded to him. Finally, noncognitivists can appeal to their preferred treatment
of normative knowledge (more precisely: normative knowledge ascriptions) to tell us
the conditions under which Lyle’s desire would be fullled—that is, the conditions un-
der which he would count as knowing that lying is wrong.31
What about supposing? Here I suggest borrowing an idea from Köhler (2017: 206-
207). Köhler proposes that noncognitivists can understand supposition (or ‘entertaining
the thought that. . . ’) as a sort of ‘make-believe belief.’ To suppose p, on this view, is
to simulate the state of believing p in certain respects—for example, by asserting p, or
by pursuing the logical consequences of p.32 Of course, this analysis would need to be
eshed out in much more detail. But, even in its bare-bones form, it should be clear that
this analysis is available to the noncognitivist. In the noncognitivist’s hands, it would
mean that when Lyle supposes that lying is wrong he is simulating having whatever
noncognitive attitude constitutes the belief that lying is wrong.
9 Coda: A Comparison with Hybrid Views
In this paper, I’ve outlined a solution to the Many Attitudes Problem. In developing my
solution, I assumed a ‘pure’ version of noncognitivism, according to which normative
beliefs are just desire-like states. However, recently a number of authors have discarded
pure noncognitivism in favor of hybrid views.33 According to hybrid theorists, normative
belief requires both a descriptive belief and a desire-like state. One reason why hybrid
views have generated such excitement is that they promise to avoid many of the prob-
lems aicting pure noncognitivism—for example, the Frege-Geach Problem.34 Do they
31Friedman also stresses the connection between wondering and knowledge, describing wondering as
an attitude that is “relieved by coming to know” (2013: 145). However, she resists any attempt to analyze
wonder as a desire to know, on the grounds that desiring is a state whereas wondering is an activity. It
is not entirely clear to me that the verb ‘wonder’ never denotes a state, but let us set that aside. Even if
Friedman is correct, we might appeal to the distinction between occurrent and standing desires, identifying
wondering with an occurrent desire to know.
32See Goldman (2006: chp.2) for a proposal along these lines.
33See, among others, Ridge (2006b, 2007, 2014); Boisvert (2008); Hay (2013); Fletcher and Ridge (2014);
Laskowski (2019); Perl (2018). For related ideas, see Toppinen (2013); Schroeder (2013a).
34See e.g., Ridge (2006b). For reservations, see Schroeder (2009).
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also avoid the Many Attitudes Problem? By way of conclusion, I’ll consider this question
and give some reason for thinking the answer is no. If I’m right, then hybrid views turn
out to be at an important disadvantage when compared to pure noncognitivist views.
To evaluate whether hybrid views avoid the Many Attitudes Problem, it will help
to have a concrete hybrid view on the table. Here, then, is a simple proposal. For Lyle
to believe that lying is wrong is for him to both (i) believe that lying instantiates some
natural property N (e.g., failing to promote happiness), (ii) disapprove of actions that
instantiate N .
This gives us a hybrid theory of normative belief. How can it be extended to non-
doxastic attitudes?
Here’s a natural thought. For any attitude α, an agent αs that φ-ing is wrong if
and only if they both (i) stand in α towards the descriptive propostion that φ-ing is N ,
(ii) disapprove of actions that instantiate N . Thus for Lyle to wonder whether lying is
wrong is for him to be in two states: a state of wondering whether lying instantiates
N , and state of disapproval of actions that instantiate N . For him to fear that lying is
wrong is for him to be in both a state of fearing that lying instantiates N , and a state of
disapproval of N -instantiating actions. Etc.
As Ridge (2014: 161) and Toppinen (2017) note, the hybrid approach seems to deliver
a straightforward solution to the Many Attitudes Problem. After all, one key feature
of this approach is that desiring, hoping, wondering and the like are always directed to-
wards descriptive contents. What makes one of these attitudes normative is not some
distinctly normative content, but rather the accompaniment of a further desire-like at-
titude. Hybrid theories thus appear to sidestep the main challenge that I’ve tackled in
this paper: eshing out a functional role for various nondoxastic attitudes that applies
to both descriptive and normative contents.
Alas, I think this easy solution is too easy. On closer examination, the hybrid ap-
proach ounders on an important class of cases: cases of full descriptive information. To
illustrate, suppose that Eugenia is an experienced doctor who works with the terminally
ill. A suering patient has requested Eugenia’s assistance in taking his life. Eugenia
might wonder whether it would be wrong to comply with the patient’s request. Accord-
ing to the hybrid analysis, Eugenia is wondering whether the action, complying with the
patient’s request instantiates N (where N is some property she happens to disapprove
of). But this seems incorrect. We can stipulate that Eugenia knows exactly which nat-
ural properties this action would instantiate. (She knows exactly how much suering
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euthanasia would relieve, exactly how it would aect the patient’s family members, etc.)
In such a case, it seems closer to the mark to say that Eugenia is wondering whether she
should disapprove of her action in virtue of these properties.
The problem is not conned to the simple hybrid theory I’ve used for illustration.
Consider, for example, the advisor-based hybrid view in Ridge (2006b, 2007). On this
view, believing euthanasia is wrong involves both (i) believing that some particular ad-
visor would disapprove of euthanasia, (ii) approving of the advisor mentioned in (i).
Generalized to any attitude α, the idea would be that α-ing that φ-ing is wrong involves
both (i) standing in α towards the descriptive proposition that some particular advisor
would disapprove of φ-ing, (ii) approving of the advisor in question. This account also
delivers the wrong results when it comes to Eugenia. After all, Eugenia might have
no doubts whatsoever about the sort of advisor who would disapprove of euthanasia.
(She could be certain that a Kantian advisor would disapprove of euthanasia, and that
a utilitarian advisor would not.) Still, she might wonder whether euthanasia is wrong,
precisely because she is uncertain which advisor to hold in high regard.35
The problem is also not specic to wondering—it arises with other attitudes. Suppose
that Eugenia complies with the patient’s request. Ruminating on her decision, she might
fear that she acted wrongly. The hybrid view analyzes her mental state as follows: she
fears that her action instantiated N (where N is again some property she holds in dis-
approval). Again, this seems to misdescribe the case. It seems closer to the mark to say
that she fears that she should disapprove of her action in virtue of some of the properties
it instantiated.
Indeed, as a referee helpfully observes, the problem even arises for the hybrid the-
orist’s attitude of choice: belief. After all, the root of the problem is this. The most
straightforward version of the hybrid strategy presupposes that there is always some
35In more recent work, Ridge (2014) has substantively revised his view. On his revised view, believing that
euthanasia is wrong involves two components: a normative perspective (understood as a conative state) and
a descriptive belief that any admissible standard would give low marks to euthanasia, where the ‘admissible
standards’ are those that are not ruled out by the normative perspective. Generalized to e.g., wondering,
the idea would be that wondering whether φ-ing is wrong involves both (i) a normative perspective n,
(ii) wondering whether φ-ing would be given low marks by any n-admissible standard. On the face of it,
this account is better-equipped to handle our problem. After all, Eugenia could know all of the descriptive
facts about euthanasia while still wondering whether euthanasia is wrong, since she could wonder whether
any standard consistent with her normative perspective permits euthanasia. But a residual worry remains.
Note that on this diagnosis, Eugenia is really wondering about the consequences of her (current) normative
perspective. This seems to misdescribe the case. Intuitively, Eugenia is not trying to gure out which
courses of action she currently disapproves of. Rather, it seems she is trying to make up her mind which
courses of action she should disapprove of.
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natural property (or some particular sort of advisor) that the agent holds in disapproval
(or approval). Given this assumption, it follows that if someone learns all of the descrip-
tive facts about an action, that should settle the question of whether they believe that
action is permissible. But as cases like Eugenia reveal, this assumption does not always
hold. Even though Eugenia knows all the descriptive facts, she still has not settled on a
belief about the moral status of euthanasia.36
Taking stock: at rst blush, hybrid theories seemed to have an easy way out of the
Many Attitudes Problem. But on closer inspection, the most straightforward versions of
the hybrid view struggle to account for cases of full descriptive information. It’s possible
that more sophisticated hybrid views can overcome this problem—I will leave this as
an open question.37 However, it is a point in favor of the pure noncognitivist solution
to the Many Attitudes Problem that it does not face this challenge. After all, the pure
noncognitivist need not assume that there is always some descriptive property/advisor
that the agent holds in approval/disapproval.38
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